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The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any other member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant.
John Stuart Mill1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although Mill's stand against coercion is probably intuitively
attractive to most people, the health care system in America generally,
and to a greater extent the mental health system, are reluctant to give
effect to such principles.2 Coercion still exists both in its hard form of
1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22 (London, John W. Parker & Son, 2d ed. 1859)
(1859). Mill may have intended for his broad notion of self-determination to apply only to the
choices made by the competent. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 165
(1979). One wonders, however, if Mill were alive today whether he would make such a
distinction in light of the concept of advance directives. Whatever Mill's intent may have been,
his words are applicable to advance directives to control one's future psychiatric treatment.
2. Phil Fennell, Inscribing Paternalism in the Law: Consent to Treatment and Mental
Disorder, 17 J.L. & Soc'Y 29, 29 (1990) ("Nowhere is the tension between autonomy and
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forced decision-making 3 and in its softer form, paternalism. 4 Psychiatric
patients' attempts to refuse or, alternatively, request a specific treatment
are often ignored.5
Historically, medical practice did not include the notion that a
patient is entitled to participate in health care decision-making; paternal-
ism was the predominant ethical theory.6 Physicians initially resisted
efforts to promote patient participation in decision-making. 7 Increas-
ingly, however, physicians are confronted with patients who have
paternalism more evident than in relation to the treatment of mentally disordered patients.").
Scholarly articles continue to reflect this paternalistic attitude. One commentator makes the bold
assertion "it is undisputed that the state has a legitimate interest in preventing the mentally ill from
harming themselves ...... Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to "Just Say No": A History and
Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA L. REV. 283, 337 (1992) (emphasis
added). Even authors writing in support of self-determination for mental health patients make this
assumption. Donald N. Bersoff, Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's
Reckless Disregard for Self-Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1571
(1992) (supporting the government's "role as a beneficent and loving parent").
3. A former mental health patient, now a patients' rights advocate, asserts that "[tlhe mental
health system ... is coercive ... because all 'mental patients' are presumed by treaters and the
staff alike to be unaware of their own needs and unable to provide for them .... ." Judi
Chamberlin, Refusing Treatment: The Patient's View, in REFUSING TREATMENT IN MENTAL
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS - VALUES IN CONFLICT 163, 167 (A. Edward Doudera & Judith P. Swazey
eds., 1982).
One of the more blatant forms of coercion in a psychiatric hospital is a physician's threat not
to discharge a patient if she does not consent to treatment. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 1, at
194. Coercion, however, may be more subtle. Chronic mental health patients become passive and
tend to abdicate control of their lives to professionals. CHARLES W. LIDZ El AL., INFORMED
CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 111 (1984). One example is a patient
whose doctors perceived the patient's passivity during a voluntary admission interview to mean
that she thought the decision to enter a psychiatric hospital was unimportant. Her physicians
ignored the absence of overt consent and asked her to sign a consent form that they knew she
could not read. id. Refusals to give consent may be futile. Hospital staff may use the patient's
delusions to convince her to consent. Id. at 117. In one case, although the physician believed the
patient was incompetent, he had her husband convince her to consent. Id. Later, when the patient
wanted to leave, she was hurried to the ward. Id. An extreme form of coercion, but one
sometimes used, is physical force. Id. at 120. In addition to physical force, physicians use the
"force of law" when unwilling patients are brought to the hospital involuntarily, but physicians
convince the patients to admit themselves voluntarily. Id. Even the method in which the consent
forms are presented may be coercive. Id. at 123. Lack of privacy may inhibit full discussion, and
staff may ask patients to sign forms in distracting settings. Id. Further, the forms may be
presented as routine or with a number of other forms, thereby de-emphasizing their significance.
Id. at 124.
4. In this context, paternalism may be thought of as a physician operating under the belief
that she can make decisions for the patient-in the patient's best interest-because of her superior
training, knowledge, and experience. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 212-13 (3d ed. 1989).
5. See infra part II.
6. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2 (1984); Developments in the
Law, Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1643 (1990) [hereinafter
Developments].
7. Developments, supra note 6, at 1643; see also KATz, supra note 6, at 1-29.
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asserted (in court and otherwise) a desire to make their own judgments.'
The notion of autonomy and, more specifically, self-determination
drive patients' claims to the predominant role in medical decision-mak-
ing.9 The importance of self-determination in health care decision-mak-
ing is predicated on the notion that the patient's well-being will best be
served by giving effect to the patient's own subjective judgments.10
Self-determination ensures that patients are shown the proper respect as
persons and are protected from arbitrary control by others." Just as
important, self-determination allows individuals to define their own val-
ues and character and to "integrat[e] [these] within a chosen life-
style." 2
The principle of self-determination has been taken to what may be
its ultimate point-the right of a competent 13 adult to issue general
guidelines or specific instructions for medical care through an advance
directive or living will that health care providers must follow if the indi-
vidual later becomes unable to state his preferences. 4 This right persists
even if the patient's instructions ultimately may result in death as a
result of his disease. But does this right of self-determination extend far
enough to implicate a mental health patient's 15 right to control his psy-
8. E.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 4, at 209-10; Developments, supra note 6, at
1643.
9. For a thorough discussion of autonomy in this context see generally BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 4, at 67-74; Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent, in 3
MAKIrNG HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 63 (President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research ed., 1982); Bersoff, supra note 2, at 1569-87;
and Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv.
1705 (1992).
10. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 9, at 15, 44 (commission report on
informed consent); Winick, supra note 9, at 1755-71.
11. 1 MAKINo HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 9, at 45.
12. Id. at 46.
13. "Competent," as it is used here, refers to an individual who is legally competent to
execute an advance directive: physically and mentally able to communicate a willful and knowing
health care decision. See infra text accompanying note 170. Incompetence cannot be assumed
merely because an individual has been diagnosed as having a mental illness or has entered a
psychiatric hospital voluntarily or involuntarily. The law presumes an individual is competent
unless legally determined otherwise. Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The
Distinction between Assent and Objection, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 41, 60-63
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991) (noting that, although mental illness may impair
competency, mentally ill persons have a significant capacity for rational thought); see also John
Parry, Incompetency, Guardianship, and Restoration, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
369, 375 (Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985) (discussing the legal distinctions between
incompetency and involuntary commitment); ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A
SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 102 (1975) (noting that incompetence does not necessarily follow
commitment); Barbara A. Weiner, Rights of Institutionalized Patients, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra, at 251, 258-59 (advocating the right to be presumed competent).
14. See infra part IIl.
15. The terminology used to denote an individual involved with the mental health system is
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chiatric treatment during periods of incompetence? This Comment
addresses that question as it relates to Florida.
A competent individual in Florida has a well-established right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment. The Florida Legislature has found
"that every competent adult has the fundamental right of self-determina-
tion regarding decisions pertaining to his own health, including the right
to choose or refuse medical treatment."' 6 To give meaning to the right
of self-determination, the Health Care Advance Directives Act 7
("Advance Directives Act") allows a competent adult to direct his future
health care through the use of a health care advance directive. More
significantly, mental health patients in Florida also have a statutory right
to forego psychiatric treatment. 8
The Advance Directives Act defines an advance directive as "a wit-
nessed written document or oral statement in which instructions are
given by a principal or in which the principal's desires are expressed
concerning any aspect of the principal's health care, and includes, but is
not limited to, the designation of a health care surrogate [or] a living
will . . . ." A health care surrogate is "any competent adult expressly
designated by a principal to make health care decisions on behalf of the
principal upon the principal's incapacity. 2 ° In the context of this stat-
ute, a living will pertains only to instructions regarding life-prolonging
procedures.2'
In exploring the use of advance directives in a mental health con-
text, Part II of this Comment considers the assumptions and values creat-
ing the controversy associated with the right of mentally ill persons to
direct their psychiatric care. Part III defines the concept of the mental
health advance directive. Part IV analyzes a patient's right to self-deter-
mination in Florida and the impact this legal doctrine may have on the
use of mental health advance directives. Finally, Part V applies the
Advance Directives Act and other Florida law to the use of advance
directives in a mental health context, demonstrates that the law supports
this expansion, and addresses some practical issues for implementing
mental health advance directives.
not without controversy. This Comment uses "patient" consistently with the terminology used by
courts and legislatures and with the common usage.
16. FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1) (1993).
17. Id. § 765.
18. Id. § 394.459(3)(a). See infra text accompanying notes 201-02.
19. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(1) (1993) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 765.101(16).
21. Id. § 765.101(12)(b).
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II. THE CONTROVERSY BEHIND THE RIGHT TO CONTROL
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT
An individual's right to control her own mental health care, particu-
larly her right to refuse treatment when she is not competent, is the sub-
ject of considerable controversy. An appreciation of the position of
mentally ill persons in society is necessary before one can understand
the controversy behind the right. Thomas Szasz, who may be the most
radical theorist in this regard, has compared the plight of individuals
labeled as mentally ill to that of persons accused of being witches during
the Inquisition.22 In his view, the various psychiatric diagnostic catego-
ries are used to label socially unacceptable behavior and to justify con-
trolling individuals exhibiting that behavior.23
A similar, but somewhat less radical view, which does not neces-
sarily reject the existence of psychiatric illness, also asserts that psychia-
try's primary purpose is social control.24 According to this theory,
defining disturbing behavior in medical terms facilitates social control
because it assumes that the individual is not acting freely and that he
may not be capable of doing so.25 This assumption justifies depriving
individuals of their rights and confining them against their will.26
Even if one does not accept all of the assumptions of these theories,
they provide insight into one possible reason for the controversy behind
the right to control one's psychiatric treatment. If society's goal for this
treatment is in fact control, it seemingly would not accept the notion of
greater rights for psychiatric patients to resist control. Even those
rejecting the social control theories concede that mental health patients
are not accepted as full members of society. As one commentator wrote,
"[t]he 'mentally ill' are . . . fundamentally unworthy" in the eyes of
society. 27 These same negative attitudes do not exist for most "physi-
cal" illnesses.2 8 It is against this normative and attitudinal backdrop that
the right to control psychiatric treatment is played out.
22. THOMAS SZAsZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 3-134 (1970).
23. Id.
24. See JONAS RorrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY 162-65, 347-71 (1980); Ronald
Leifer, Introduction: The Medical Model as the Ideology of the Therapeutic State, I 1 J. MIND &
BEHAV. 247 (1990).
25. Leifer, supra note 24, at 252.
26. Id.; see also PETER R. BREOGN, TOXIC PSYCHIATRY 21-46 (1991) (detailing the use of
drugs to control behavior); Seth Farber, Institutional Mental and Social Control: The Ravages of
Epistemological Hubris, I I J. MIND & BEHAV. 285 (1990) (arguing that institutional mental
health seeks social control).
27. Farber, supra note 26, at 293; see also BREGGIN, supra note 26, at 26 ("The notion of
madness or derangement has many connotations, mostly negative .... ").
28. ROBITSCHER, supra note 24, at 232.
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A. The Right to Refuse Treatment
At its core, the right to refuse psychiatric treatment is based on the
same values of autonomy and self-determination as the right to refuse
treatment generally. But the right to refuse psychiatric treatment gener-
ates greater controversy. For example, although the right to die gets
more attention, the right to refuse psychiatric drugs is more conten-
tious.29 Both concern a right to refuse highly intrusive interventions.
The right to die, however, is ironically less regulated than the right to
control one's mind.30 This may be due, at least in part, to judges' atti-
tudes towards mental health patients, to the extent their attitudes reflect
society's. 31
Some view the right to refuse psychiatric treatment within a polit-
ical framework.32 In this context, the struggle to secure an absolute right
to refuse psychiatric treatment is compared to the struggle for civil and
women's rights.33 Like those situations, when a group that society per-
ceives as being unable to speak for itself begins to do so, a social
upheaval ensues.34 Mental health professionals, like slavemasters and
men, see themselves as "benevolent" and see patients as "needy and
helpless. 3 5 Mental health professionals are threatened when patients
assert control over their own lives. Consequently, they will object and
proclaim their own beneficence. 36 At the same time, mental health pro-
fessionals will point out the harmful consequences to patients if they
achieve their goal of self-determination and, on this basis, fight to main-
tain control.37
This control is difficult to justify because weighing the risks and
benefits of consenting to treatment is value-laden. 38 Forcibly medi-
cating a patient accords greater weight to freedom from mental illness 39
than to the moral "costs of overriding the patient's wishes and exposing
.. . her to [unwanted] side effects."4 Although the physician's treat-
29. Parry, supra note 13, at 472.
30. Id.
31. See id.; see also Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 629 (1993) ("Judges ... , consciously or unconsciously,
often rely on reductionist, prejudicial stereotypes in their decisionmaking ... .
32. E.g., Chamberlin, supra note 3, at 167.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 168.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Ellen W. Clayton, From Rogers to Rivers: The Rights of the Mentally Ill to Refuse
Medication, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 19 (1987).
39. This assumes, for the moment, that psychotropic drugs have that impact.
40. Clayton, supra note 38, at 19.
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ment choice may be objectively4 in the patient's best interests, society
generally does not support the position of always intervening in a per-
son's best interest unless the stakes are very high.4 2 Even then, individ-
uals are usually free to engage in life-threatening activities if that is their
choice.43
Those who oppose the unfettered right to refuse psychiatric treat-
ment often rely on the medical profession's interests in having its ethical
obligations honored.4 In the psychiatric context, the ethical problems
of physicians are accorded greater weight than in a termination of life
support scenario because psychiatric patients are often committed to the
physician's care and they cannot discharge them.45 Another common
argument used in opposition to the right to refuse psychiatric treatment,
particularly medication, is that the treatment refusal results from the
patient's illness and, therefore, should not be honored.4 6 Studies show-
41. The physician's choice may be objective to the degree that medical research may support
the physician's decision based on amelioration of symptoms or some other criteria, and that the
majority of people would agree with the physician. See id. at 21.
42. Laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets are an excellent example. In 1975, forty-
seven states had such laws; but by 1980, only seventeen states required adults to wear helmets.
DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 307 (1986). Subsequently, fatalities
increased by forty-six percent. Id. One possible justification for repealing these laws is based on
the notion that it is morally wrong to interfere with a competent person's choices if he is not
harming others. Id. at 307-08. A more current example is bungee jumping. Bungee jumping
involves jumping off of various types of platforms with an elastic cord tied around the ankle or
waist. After two recent deaths, only three states (including Florida) moved to regulate the "sport."
Larry McShane, Bungee Jumpers in Stretch Run for Their Rights, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1992, at
A34. One author summed up the argument in favor of allowing the activity by quoting one
bungee operator as saying that "in the end, it boils down to personal freedom." Jesse Snyder,
Newsday Student Briefing Page on the News, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 1992, at 20.
43. The Supreme Court of Florida recently reasoned in the context of a blood transfusion
refusal case involving a mother with minor children that "[slociety does not ... disparage or
preclude one from performing an act of bravery resulting in the loss of that person's life simply
because that person has parental responsibilities." In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 826 (Fla.
1993).
44. See Clayton, supra note 38, at 23-24; see also Samuel J. Brakel & John M. Davis, Taking
Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV.
429, 430 (1991).
45. Brakel & Davis, supra note 44 (noting that psychiatrists are "cornered into ethical and
legal no-win positions as they must watch patients, committed to their charges by the state
because the patients are incapable of recognizing their need for treatment, fall prisoner to this
'liberty interest' they have chosen to exercise.") (footnotes omitted). But see infra notes 71-74.
46. E.g., Guardianship of Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1285 (Mass. 1992) ("[T]he [trial] judge
determined that the ward is 'incompetent to make medical treatment decisions . . . due to his
mental illness."'); Steven K. Hoge et al., A Prospective, Multicenter Study of Patients' Refusal of
Antipsychotic Medication, 47 ARCHIVES GErN. PSYCHIATRY 949, 955 (1990) (finding that the
majority of "medication refusers" were judged incompetent by their physicians); Gladys Kessler,
Remarks on the Judge's Role and Moral Certainty, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 34 (1991)
(noting that the issue of incompetency is not raised unless the patient rejects the treatment options
pressed on her by her "all knowing doctor"); Nancy K. Rhoden, The Presumption for Treatment:
Has It Been Justified?, 13 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 65, 65 (1985) (rejecting the use of a
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ing that refusal actually correlates with the severity of side effects under-
mine this view. 7
The usual justifications for involuntary treatment of psychiatric
patients are the state's parens patriae and police powers.48 The parens
patriae doctrine developed out of the monarch's common law preroga-
tive to act as the guardian of all "lunatics."4 9 The Supreme Court of
Florida has used the parens patriae doctrine to justify the state's right to
involuntarily hospitalize mentally ill individuals who need treatment but
are unable to make this decision for themselves.5° Some argue that the
parens patriae power is only justified, if at all, when the individual is
incompetent; otherwise, the individual's liberty right trumps. 51 It is pri-
marily this power that a patient's right to refuse treatment and the use of
advance directives implicates.
A state's police power allows it to confine mentally ill individuals
solely to protect society from dangers posed by such individuals.52 This
physician's recommendation as evidence of incompetency). One commentator made the
interesting point that a patient's decision to consent to treatment is rarely questioned in this
manner. Winick, supra note 13, at 51-58 (noting that competency is not questioned when a
patient gives an informed consent and such decisions do not receive judicial scrutiny as treatment
refusals do).
47. See Theodore Van Putten et al., Subjective Response to Antipsychotic Drugs, 38
ARCHIvES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187 (1981); Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophrenic Patients
Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHIVES Gm. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1974).
48. See generally Samuel J. Brakel, Involuntary Institutionalization, in THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 13, at 21, 24-25. One study concluded that if patients had an
absolute right to refuse medication, a significant number would do so "resulting in prolonged
hospitalization, increased morbidity both for the patient and for fellow patients, disruption of the
therapeutic milieu, and a considerable investment of time on the part of clinical staff." Hoge et
al., supra note 46, at 955. One could also argue that the state has an economic interest in treating
mentally ill individuals. The argument rests on the notion that through treatment these persons
may return to productive life, thus reducing the state's economic burden. Cf. VANDEVEER, supra
note 42, at 309-12 (discussing this argument in the context of motorcycle helmet laws, among
others). These factors have one thing in common: increased cost. See Jessica Litman, Note, A
Common Law Remedy for Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1720, 1723 (1982) (noting that the current system of limited patient rights is cost efficient).
49. Mary C. McCarron, Comment, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs: Safeguarding
the Mentally Incompetent Patient's Right to Procedural Due Process, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 477,
489-90 (1990).
50. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 485 (Fla. 1977). The United States Supreme Court also
has recognized that the states are vested with parens patriae power to protect persons unable to
care for themselves. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972).
51. See Clayton, supra note 38, at 29; Litman, supra note 48, at 1743; McCarron, supra note
49, at 491.
52. In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 486 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83
(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992)
("[K]eeping [a patient] against his will in a mental institution is improper absent a determination
... of current mental illness and dangerousness."). The public generally assumes that mentally ill
persons are frequently dangerous. BRUCE J. ENNIs, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL
PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW 225 (1972). Evidence suggests that this is not true and
[Vol. 48:193
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same justification is used when the state takes measures against a patient
to prevent harm to other patients and staff within an institution. 3 The
obvious underlying goal in these instances is behavior control rather
than treatment.5 4  When a patient is medicated, secluded, or restrained
for behavior control rather than treatment, however, the right to refuse
treatment is not technically implicated. In this situation, the state must
use the least restrictive means necessary to achieve this control.5 5 Even
in this context, advance directives may be given effect. The patient may
state that, to her, the least restrictive means of control is seclusion or
restraint rather than medication. Reference to the potential side effects
of medication could support her statement. If the patient's preferred
method of control would be effective and within the hospital's power to
effectuate, the patient's rights should trump the state's preference for
any particular method of control. Police power will still prove to be a
limitation on the use of mental health advance directives because of the
state's interest in protecting third parties but will not limit their validity.
B. Antipsychotic Medications56
Antipsychotic medications may be the most controversial issue in
in any event that psychiatrists are not reliable predictors of dangerousness. Id. at 225-27; Id. at
25-36. This data is the foundation for the argument that involuntary hospitalization on the basis of
dangerousness is not justified. STONE, supra note 13, at 25-36. Other commentators, although
accepting the data, assert that reliance on the data ignores the moral responsibility to protect
society to the extent possible. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 160-61.
53. See Clayton, supra note 38, at 29; Litman, supra note 48, at 1738; McCarron, supra note
49, at 491.
54. See Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Nonconsensual Treatment of Involuntarily
Committed Mentally Ill Persons with Neuroleptic or Antipsychotic Drugs as Violative of State
Constitutional Guaranty, 74 A.L.R.4th 1099, 1102 (1989). Arguably, these measures are in
themselves treatment because they relieve symptoms of the patient's mental illness. See
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 n.8, 227 (1990). But see id. at 249-50 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (assuming the goal to be behavior control, not treatment).
55. The United States Supreme Court appeared to have weakened this requirement by its
support of the professional judgment standard in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-22
(1982) (holding that due process required only that a hospital exercise professional judgment in its
decision to physically restrain a mentally retarded patient for his safety or that of others and that
the Court would not examine alternative forms of treatment). The Court, however, has recently
supported the doctrine of least restrictive alternatives, at least in the context of medicating a
prisoner during trial. Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815-16 (1992) (holding that the state
violated a prisoner's due process rights when it medicated him against his will without
considering less intrusive alternatives).
56. Antipsychotic medications (also called neuroleptics and, incorrectly, major tranquilizers)
are used in the treatment of psychosis. Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind
Control," "Synthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally
Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REV. 77, 79 (1983). Psychosis is a
"major mental disorder ... in which a person's ability to think, respond emotionally, remember,
communicate, interpret reality, and behave appropriately is sufficiently impaired so as to interfere
19931
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the debate over the right to refuse treatment.57 Physicians have used
antipsychotic medications to treat schizophrenia 8 and other forms of
psychoses since the 1950s. 59 According to studies, these drugs limit
schizophrenia's most oppressive symptoms but do not lead to a cure. 60
Antipsychotic medications have had a profound effect on hospital
atmosphere6' and have reduced the need for and length of hospitaliza-
tion.62 Although there is substantial evidence of the positive effects of
these medications,63 evidence also shows that they produce substantial
side effects that range from minor, temporary problems to major, perma-
nent disabilities and even death.6' Additionally, physicians frequently
misuse antipsychotic medications because of poor diagnosis or inappro-
priate dosaging 65 or because of improper motivation such as punish-
ment.6 6 These issues underlie the controversy over the right to refuse
psychiatric treatment, particularly medications, as well as a patient's
desire to express that right.
grossly with the capacity to meet the ordinary demands of life." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
GLOSSARY 139 (Evelyn M. Stone ed., 6th ed. 1985).
57. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 56, at 77 (noting that "these cases have created a
storm of controversy in both the medical and legal professions ...."); Brief of the American
Orthopsychiatric Association, Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989)
(No. S004002) (discussing implications of forced medication as a matter of mental health policy).
58. Schizophrenia is a "large group of disorders.., manifested by characteristic disturbances
of language and communication, thought, perception, affect, and behavior." AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY, supra note 56, at 149 (emphasis omitted). These symptoms sometimes
express themselves as hallucinations, delusions, mood swings, and "bizarre" behavior. Id. Not all
scholars accept the notion that schizophrenia exists as a disease entity. Rather, some see it as a
label applied to individuals with unusual and socially unacceptable behavior and a means to
control these individuals. E.g., BREGGIN, supra note 26, at 21-46; Theodore R. Sarbin, Toward
the Obsolescence of the Schizophrenia Hypothesis, I I J. MIND & BEHAV. 259 (1990). See
generally SzAsz, supra note 22 (comparing the mental health movement to the Inquisition).
59. Alexander D. Brooks, Law and Antipsychotic Medications, 4 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 247,
248 (1986); McCarron, supra note 49, at 480.
60. Cichon, supra note 2, at 294; Litman, supra note 48, at 1726; McCarron, supra note 49, at
481.
61. Brooks, supra note 59, at 248.
62. Brakel & Davis, supra note 44, at 449-50; Brooks, supra note 59, at 248; Cichon, supra
note 2, at 292-93.
63. See, e.g., Brakel & Davis, supra note 44, at 444-61 and citations therein; Cichon, supra
note 2, at 292-95.
64. Common temporary side effects include muscle spasms (dystonia); motor restlessness
(akathesia); and sleepiness (akinesia). The most common serious side effect is tardive dyskinesia
which manifests itself by grotesque movements of the tongue, face, mouth, and limbs. For long-
term medication users, the condition is irreversible and usually not discovered until it has become
severely disabling. Rarely, death may result from a condition know as neuroleptic malignant
syndrome which is characterized by a sudden steep elevation in body temperature. See Brakel &
Davis supra note 44, at 461-64; Brooks, supra note 59, at 249-50; Cichon, supra note 2, at 297-
310; Litman, supra note 48, at 1726-27.
65. See Cichon, supra note 2, at 296; McCarron, supra note 49, at 483.
66. See Brooks, supra note 59, at 252.
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III. THE MENTAL HEALTH CARE ADVANCE DIRECTIVE
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research found that honoring
an advance directive shows respect for self-determination.67 It does so
by providing reassurance that "a course of conduct promotes [a]
patient's subjective, individual evaluation of well-being. ' 6 Addition-
ally, honoring the advance directive shows respect for the patient as an
individual. 69 Although the President's Commission may not have been
necessarily addressing mental health issues when it wrote those words,
applying them in a mental health context furthers the same values that
the Commission promoted.71
The suggestion that advance directives be used for mental health
care is not new. The concept has arisen in two contexts: an advance
directive binding oneself to future treatment during periods of incompe-
tency even though one might later refuse such treatment 71 and an
advance directive rejecting certain or all treatment.72 One also may state
a preference for a particular form of treatment.73
67. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 9, at 49.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Not all theorists would agree with this statement. A counterargument is that in some
cases physicians are justified in overriding a patient's wishes because the patient would thank the
physician if she could. STONE, supra note 13, at 66-70. The test is whether a reasonable person
would want to be treated that way. Id. at 69; see also Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse
Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 689 (1993) (reviewing the basis of the "thank you" theory and its relationship to other
competency theories). A second counterargument uses the "different person" theory. Under this
theory, when a person is mentally ill, it is not the person's "true" self speaking. The true person's
wishes are not being furthered. According to this theory, this would be true even when the person
is considered legally competent to execute an advance directive, as long as she is mentally ill.
Saks, supra, at 697-700; see also John Churchill, Advance Directives: Beyond Respect for
Freedom, in ADVANCE DIRECIVES IN MEDICINE 171, 172-74 (Chris Hackler et al. eds., 1989)
(expressing concern about the use of advance directives when the self cannot be identified).
Another commentator presents a similar theory under the rubric "psychological continuity." This
commentator, however, concludes that although the individual's personal identity may vary this
does not by itself counsel against using advance directives. Allen Buchanan, Advance Directives
and the Personal Identity Problem, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 277 (1988). Not all commentators
share Buchanan's view that the psychological continuity issue does not make advance directives
inappropriate. E.g., Jennifer Radden, Planning for Mental Disorder: Buchanan and Brock on
Advance Directives in Psychiatry, 18 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 165 (1992) (expressing concern
about personality changes).
71. The so-called "Ulysses contract." See infra text accompanying notes 74-77.
72. Such an advance directive has been more commonly referred to as a "living will." This
name is inadequate to describe the breadth of an advance directive's coverage. See infra text
accompanying note 171.
73. See Jean Hopfensperger, Mental Patients Can Direct Treatment with a "Living Will,"
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 17, 1992, at lB (describing an advance directive containing
treatment preferences). Statements of treatment preferences are just that-preferences.
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The type of advance directive that binds one to treatment during
periods of incompetency is commonly referred to as a "Ulysses con-
tract."74 The concept emerged, in part, as a reaction to involuntary hos-
pitalization criteria.75  The contract is designed to empower competent
individuals to give legally enforceable instructions applicable during
future episodes of acute mental illness when they refuse treatment but do
not meet civil commitment criteria.76 Such a contract authorizes invol-
untary hospitalization and may specify certain forms of treatment when
the enumerated diagnostic criteria are met.77
In 1982, Thomas Szasz was one of the first to propose a mental
health advance directive.78 Szasz's conception never really caught on.
Recently, however, the concept is receiving renewed attention in the
Statements of preference, unlike those rejecting certain treatments, do not legally bind physicians
to treat a patient as requested if they do not agree with the patient's treatment choice. See FLA.
STAT. § 394.460 (1993) (giving physicians the right not to treat a patient); Clayton, supra note 38,
at 25-26 (professionals are not forced to do what they do not want to do).
74. See JOHN ELSTER, ULLYSSES AND THE SIRENS 38 (1979) ("Persons with periodically
recurring mental illness may (but rarely do) bind themselves in advance, by issuing instructions
that when the next episode occurs, the instructions that will then be issued . . . are not to be
obeyed."). This type of advance directive was so named because of Ulysses' instructions to his
crew to tie him to the mast of their ship before they approached the lure of the Sirens and not to
untie him until they had passed, regardless of what he said. 2 THE GREEK MYTHS 361 (Robert
Graves trans., 1955).
75. See Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of
the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777, 779-81 (1982); see also R.
E. Reinert, A Living Will for a Commitment Hearing, 31 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 857
(1980) (discussing the restrictive procedural requirements for involuntary hospitalization). The
concept is not without its current advocates, although generally discredited by those concerned
with patients' civil rights. See generally Marilyn K. Rosenson & Agnes M. Kasten, Another View
of Autonomy: Arranging for Consent in Advance, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 1 (1991). But see
Joseph A. Rogers and J. Benedict Centifanti, Beyond "Self-Paternalism": A Response to
Rosenson and Kasten, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 9 (1991).
76. Dresser, supra note 75, at 777.
77. Id. at 780.
78. Thomas S. Szasz, The Psychiatric Will: A New Mechanism for Protecting Persons
Against "Psychosis" and Psychiatry, 37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 762, 766 (1982) ("[C]ompetent...
adults should have a recognized right to reject involuntary psychiatric interventions that they may
be deemed to require in the future, when they are not competent to make decisions concerning
their own welfare."). Contra Paul Chodoff & Roger Peele, The Psychiatric Will of Dr. Szasz, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (1983). At least one commentator recommends use of the Ulysses
contract to protect against court-appointed attorneys who believe that mental illness is a myth.
Reinert, supra note 75, at 858.
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literature,7 9 in the broadcast media 80 and in at least two states legisla-
tures." As noted above, the advance directive is generally thought of as
a mechanism to refuse unwanted treatment, including hospitalization,
and to state treatment preferences. Additionally, an advance directive
can be used simply to designate a surrogate, familiar with the patient's
values, to make decisions for her. Whatever the nature of the instruc-
tions contained in an advance directive, the value of self-determination
is being furthered.
IV. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION IN FLORIDA
The right to control one's own medical care in Florida, as in all
states, is based primarily on the rights guaranteed by the state's constitu-
tion and statutes as interpreted by Florida courts. Federal law also is
implicated to the extent that it provides any greater rights than state law
or that it requires any procedural protection for patients exercising their
rights.
79. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DON W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS
OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 350-57 (1989) (comprehensively reviewing the moral and
ethical arguments supporting the use of mental health advance directives); Paul S. Appelbaum,
Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 983 (1991)
(reviewing the pros and cons of advance directives); Audrey Macklin, Bound to Freedom: The
Ulysses Contract and the Psychiatric Will, 45 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 37 (1987) (comparing
advance directives to Ulysses contracts); John W. Parry, The Court's Role in Decisionmaking
Involving Incompetent Refusals of Life-Sustaining Care and Psychiatric Medications, 14 MENTAL
& PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 468, 474 (1990) (stating that current living will and consent
statutes do not apply to psychiatric treatment refusals and that it is uncertain if institutions would
honor them, especially if patient control were perceived as necessary); Radden, supra note 70
(arguing that the use of advance directives in psychiatry is not justified); Deborah S. Pinkney,
Advance Directive Could Give Mentally Ill More Treatment Control, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 16,
1991, at 3, 22 (describing the potential benefits of advance directives).
80. Mentally Ill Homeless & Intervention (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 29, 1992).
81. Minnesota has specifically recognized by statute mental health advance directives. The
statute requires that, except in an emergency, incompetent persons who have an advance directive
must be treated in accordance with that directive with regard to electroshock therapy and
neuroleptic medication. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03(6b) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). Court
orders also can override medication refusals. Id. § 253B.03(6c)(c). The statute specifically
provides that instructions can be given both to consent to and to refuse treatment. Id.
§ 253B.03(6d)(a). Except in an emergency, voluntary patients' instructions cannot be overridden
unless the patient is committed as mentally ill and a court orders the treatment. Id.
§ 253B.03(6d)(d); see generally Gayle Dixon, The Minnesota Advance Psychiatric Directive:
Protecting Patient Decision Making, 75 MED. L. & POL'Y 33 (1992); Roberto Cuca, Note, Ulysses
in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Advance Directive Statute, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 1152 (1993). For a discussion of the background of this statute, see
Hopfensperger, supra note 73. Massachusetts's advance directive statute specifically defines
health care decisions to include mental health decisions. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, § I
(West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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A. Federal Law
1. FEDERAL CASE LAW
The United States Supreme Court assumed in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health that individuals possess a "constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
... "82 Cruzan is the Court's most recent statement concerning an
individual's right to refuse treatment.
The Cruzan Court cited three earlier decisions involving psychiatric
patients to support the right to refuse treatment: Washington v.
Harper,83 Vitek v. Jones,84 and Parham v. J.R.8 5 First, in Harper, the
Court recognized that mentally ill convicted prisoners possess "a signifi-
cant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antip-
sychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '8 6 Second, the Cruzan Court cited Vitek for the proposi-
tion that a prisoner's "transfer to a mental hospital coupled with
mandatory behavior modification implicated liberty interests." '87
Finally, quoting Parham, the Court noted that "'a child, in common with
adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessa-
rily for medical treatment."' 88
The United States Supreme Court's recognition of a competent
patient's liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical care is helpful to
Florida mental health patients attempting to control their future care. It
does not, however, implicate the use of advance directives because
Nancy Cruzan had not left any written instructions regarding her care in
the event of incompetency. In fact, the Cruzan Court specifically
declined to determine whether a state might be required to defer to the
decisions of a surrogate appointed by the patient.8 9
2. FEDERAL STATUTES
By enacting the Patient Self-Determination Act ("PSDA"), Con-
gress partially made the determination that the Cruzan Court declined to
82. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). In a footnote, the court rejected the notion that the right to
privacy encompasses the right to refuse treatment. Id. at 279 n.7.
83. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
84. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
85. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
86. 494 U.S. at 221-22, quoted in Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
87. 497 U.S. at 278.
88. Id. at 278-79.
89. Id. at 287 n.12.
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make.90 The PSDA requires that covered entities 9t inquire of every
adult patient upon admission whether the patient has executed an
advance directive and provide written information concerning the
patient's rights under state statutory and case law to make her own deci-
sions concerning medical care. This information must include the right
to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the right to formu-
late advance directives if state law grants this right.92
Although these provisions are generally procedural, there is one
important substantive requirement. The hospital may "not... condition
the provision of care or otherwise discriminate against an individual
based on whether or not the individual has executed an advance
directive. 93
Was the PSDA intended to apply to patients being admitted to psy-
chiatric hospitals? The PSDA itself does not distinguish between types
of hospitals but merely uses the term "hospital." More significantly, the
PSDA's requirements specifically apply to community mental health
centers that provide partial hospitalization services. 94 It is unlikely that
Congress intended the PSDA to apply to providers of partial psychiatric
hospitalization services and not to providers of full psychiatric hospitali-
zation services.
Assuming that the PSDA does apply to psychiatric hospitals, did
Congress intend for it to apply to mental health advance directives or
only the more traditional form of living will? The language of the
PSDA itself does not differentiate between types of advance directives.
In fact, as already noted, an advance directive for the PSDA's purposes
is whatever state law says it is.95 Further, the legislative history of the
PSDA does not indicate that Congress intended its provisions to apply
only in limited circumstances. In introducing the bill to the House of
Representatives, Congressman Sander M. Levin said that he was doing
so "with the purpose of ensuring that a person's right to determine their
[sic] own health care future is respected. 9 6 Similarly, on its introduc-
90. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1395cc(f) & 1396a(w) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). The PSDA (an
amendment to the Social Security Act establishing the Medicare and Medicaid programs) applies
to entities participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs. Id. Therefore, the PSDA applies
to all Florida state psychiatric hospitals and any private hospital participating in either program.
91. Any service provider participating in Medicare or Medicaid are considered entities. Id.
§ 1396a(w)(1).
92. Id. § 1396a(w)(I)(A)(i). The implementing regulations are found in Advance
Directives-Requirements for Providers, 42 C.F.R. § 489.102 (1993). The Act defines .advance
directives to be a written instrument, recognized under state law, relating to an incapacitated
individual's health care. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(3).(West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395cc(f)(1)(C) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
94. Id. § 1395cc(e)(2).
95. See supra note 92.
96. 136 CONG. REc. E943 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990).
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tion in the Senate, Senator John Danforth said that this bill "will protect
a person's right to self-determination in health care decisions." 97 Sena-
tor Danforth went on to say that "[p]eople clearly have an indisputable
right to refuse treatment." 98
Both Senator Danforth99 and Congressman Levin'0° used as exam-
ples, however, cases of termination of artificial life support. One should
not take these examples to automatically exclude other situations. They
were probably used because they were topical.1"' If Congress intended
for the provisions of the PSDA to apply so narrowly, one would expect
that Congress would have included appropriate language in the legisla-
tion. Congress did not.
Further assuming that the PSDA applies to mental health advance
directives, then upon admission hospitals must inform adult patients of
their rights under state law to make treatment decisions. This includes
the right to refuse treatment and to execute an advance directive. This
requirement raises three important issues for those patients being admit-
ted who do not have advance directives.
The first issue is competency. The PSDA does not address this
issue. Theoretically, then, hospitals are required to follow the same
requirements for competent as well as incompetent patients. 10 2 The
United States Supreme Court requires Florida to ensure that patients
who are admitting themselves voluntarily are competent to give
informed consent for admission.10 3 This issue of competency, therefore,
should not arise for these patients. For patients who are adjudicated
incompetent or whose competency status is uncertain, the exercise of
informing them of their rights may be a hollow one because they cannot
understand all of the ramifications of electing whether to exercise their
97. 135 CONG. REc. S13566 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1989).
98. Id.
99. Id. at S13567 (referring, among others, to Nancy Cruzan).
100. 136 CONG. REc. E943 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (referring to the case of Nancy Cruzan).
101. Both Senator Danforth and Congressman Levin referred to the then-recent case of Nancy
Cruzan. See supra notes 96, 99.
102. See Karen N. Swisher, Implementing the PSDA for Psychiatric Patients: A Common-
Sense Approach, 2 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 199, 199 (1991). Arguably, a covered entity may not have
to inform a patient who already has been adjudicated incompetent because at that point she does
not have the right to execute an advance directive. Nonetheless, nothing in the PSDA indicates
that the requirement only applies if the patient can exercise her right at that time.
103. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132-38 (1990). If the patient is not competent, an
evaluation must be conducted to determine whether he meets the criteria for involuntary
examination. If not, he cannot be admitted. Id. at 134-35. Whether this holding is applicable to
other states is unclear because the facts of the case apply to Florida's mental health system. This
is the very problem that the Ulysses contract was intended to address. But see Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of
Zinermon v. Burch, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 13, at 83 (arguing that
this interpretation is dicta and its impact on practice and future court decisions is uncertain).
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rights. It may be inappropriate to rigidly follow the requirements of the
PSDA for these patients. Legally incompetent patients have guardians
to whom this information may be given, but it is questionable whether
this practice would be acceptable because the PSDA is silent on the
issue. Indeed, Congress may need to amend the PSDA, or the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services may need to develop regulations to
address this problem.1"
The second issue is whether it is appropriate to discuss these sub-
jects at the time a psychiatric patient is admitted." °5 Patients being
admitted to a psychiatric hospital are, by definition, in a problematic
emotional or cognitive state. One must question the patient's ability to
fully comprehend an explanation of her rights at this time or even the
therapeutic appropriateness of explaining them in that context. The
question of whether to give depressed or suicidal patients information
about their right to die serves as an obvious example. 10 6 Once again, it
may be necessary to implement the PSDA flexibly to ensure that the
rights it confers to patients are not empty.
The third issue is closely related to the first two-the coercive
environment of the psychiatric hospital." 7 Because the patient is in a
vulnerable emotional state and possibly of uncertain competence when
she is admitted to a hospital, she may be inclined to follow the "advice"
of hospital personnel to not execute an advance directive or not refuse
specific forms of treatment. Likewise, many patients are eager to be
released from the hospital and would do whatever they think will
advance this goal. The hospital staff would, therefore, be free to treat a
patient in what they consider to be her best interest. By the time that the
patient is stable and better able to comprehend her rights to control her
treatment, she may have forgotten the discussion concerning her rights,
if she even understood her rights at the time.
Although these are serious issues, they can be addressed and will be
104. The preamble to the proposed rules implementing the PSDA mentioned this issue, but the
subject is not addressed in the regulations. 57 Fed. Reg. 8194, 8197 (1992). The preamble
suggested that facilities give the information to the "family or surrogate to the extent that it issues
other materials about policies and procedures to the family of the incapacitated patient or to a
surrogate or other concerned person in accordance with State law." Id. The facility still should
give the information to the patient when he is able to understand it. Id.
105. An important issue beyond the scope of this Comment involves the therapeutic
appropriateness of discussing the right-to-die aspects of advance directives with psychiatric
patients during the admission process for psychiatric treatment or even later in their stay.
106. See Linda Ganzini et al., Is the Patient Self-Determination Act Appropriate for Elderly
Persons Hospitalized for Depression?, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 46 (1993) (arguing against
discussing advance directives and the right to die when depressed elderly patients are admitted to
a psychiatric unit).
107. See supra note 3.
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below. First, however, one must determine the extent of a patient's
rights under Florida law.
B. Florida Law
The rights that the Florida Constitution, statutes, and case law grant
to patients extend considerably beyond those provided by the United
States Constitution and federal statutes, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.
1. THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
The Florida Constitution provides that "[e]very natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein."108 Although the
United States Supreme Court found that no generalized privacy interest
exists in the right to refuse medical treatment, Florida residents have a
constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy that is broader than the right
provided by the United States Constitution.' °9 The Supreme Court of
Florida has construed this provision to give Florida residents the right to
refuse unwanted medical care subject to certain state interests.
2. FLORIDA CASE LAW
No Florida court has published an opinion specifically addressing
the right to refuse psychiatric treatment. Yet, Florida courts have
addressed the right to refuse treatment in the context of general medical
care in language broad enough to include the right to refuse psychiatric
treatment.
The line of cases involving the right to refuse treatment began in
1978 with Satz v. Perlmutter. "° Mr. Perlmutter was a competent elderly
man who sought to have the hospital remove the artificial life support
that was keeping him alive."' The court held that a competent, adult
patient has the right to refuse or discontinue treatment based "upon the
constitutional right to privacy.., an expression of sanctity of individual
free choice and self-determination.""' 2 The court limited this right
based upon four state interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the pro-
tection of innocent third parties; (3) suicide prevention; and (4) the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 13
108. FLA. CONST. art. I., § 23 (amended 1980).
109. Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985).
110. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), afftd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
111. Id. at 161.
112. Id. at 162 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 426 (Mass. 1977)).
113. Id. at 162.
(Vol. 48:193
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
In discussing the state's interest in preserving life, the court distin-
guished between curable and incurable afflictions." 4 The court based
its decision on the fact that Mr. Perlmutter's situation was terminal."t 5 It
construed the protection of innocent third parties as generally involving
a patient's minor children. 1' 6
The court differentiated Mr. Perlmutter's intent from suicide by
noting that "a death producing agent" would not be the cause of his
death; the fulfillment of his request would lead to his natural death."17
The court also found it significant that Mr. Perlmutter's basic wish was
to live and that he did not self-induce his affliction." 8 Importantly, the
court did not limit its discussion to the removal of a life-prolonging
device, but included the refusal of a positive step, such as surgery or
chemotherapy, to prolong a hopeless situation." 9
The ethical integrity of the medical profession and the ability of
hospitals effectively to care for their patients were the last state interests
the court considered. The court reasoned that prevailing medical ethics
recognized the right to refuse necessary medical treatment under circum-
stances such as these.'2 ° More importantly, the court went on to say that
"if the doctrines of informed consent and right of privacy have as their
foundations the right to bodily integrity . . . and control of one's own
fate, then those rights are superior to the institutional considerations.''
This statement begins the court's erosion of the state's interest in the
ethical integrity of the medical profession as a consideration.
The next case in this line, John F. Kennedy Hospital v. Blud-
worth, 22 extended the right to refuse treatment to incompetent, termi-
nally ill patients on artificial life support.123 The court carefully framed
its discussion, however, to exclude situations where the patient's life
could be saved. 124 The importance of this case is the holding that court
approval prior to terminating life support is not necessary and "could
render the right of the incompetent a nullity."' 25 The court went on to
hold that the patient's family or guardian, under the substituted judg-
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 163.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (Mass. 1977)).
122. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
123. The patient in this case had a "Mercy Will and Last Testament" indicating the patient's
desire not to be kept alive by means of artificial life support. Id. at 922.
124. Id. at 924.
125. Id. at 925.
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ment doctrine, could exercise this right.'2 6 The court recognized living
wills as persuasive evidence of the patient's intent and stated that they
"should be given great weight" by the person exercising substituted
judgment.127
The Supreme Court of Florida further expanded the right to refuse
medical treatment to competent patients on artificial life support systems
who are not terminally ill. In Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade
County,12 the court considered the case of a Jehovah's Witness who
refused a life-saving blood transfusion. 129 In discussing the state's inter-
est in preserving life, the court reaffirmed the right to refuse medical
treatment "regardless of whether [the patient's] refusal to do so arises
from fear of adverse reaction, religious belief, recalcitrance or cost.' 30
Mrs. Wons had two minor children, and thus the court found it necessary
to consider the interests of innocent third parties under the state's parens
patriae power. It determined that, because there were other family mem-
bers willing to care for the children, they were not being abandoned and
that the state's interest was not sufficiently compelling to override Mrs.
Wons' constitutional rights.' 3'
The court's opinion expresses the ethical underpinnings of the right
to refuse medical treatment in very broad language:
Running through all of these decisions ...is the courts' deeply
imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an indi-
vidual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to
lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasona-
ble governmental interference. Surely nothing, in the last analysis, is
more private or more sacred than one's ... view of life, and here the
courts, quite properly, have given great deference to the individual's
right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life according to
his own conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is,
without exaggeration, the very bedrock on which this country was
founded.' 32
The broadest right to refuse treatment is found in the recent case of
126. Id. at 926. The court defined substituted judgment as a situation where the family
member or guardian substitutes her judgment for what she believes the patient, if competent,
would have done under the circumstances. Id.
127. Id.
128. 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), afftd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
129. Id. at 680. The trial court ordered the hospital to administer the blood, and Mrs. Wons
survived the illness. Id. at 683. The appellate court determined that the case was not moot because
it was a recurring issue that would otherwise escape review. Id. at 684.
130. Id. at 685 (quoting St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA
1985)).
131. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97. The Supreme Court of Florida recently reaffirmed this holding.
In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
132. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 686-87 (emphasis added).
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In re Guardianship of Browning.33 The court held that the guardian of
an incompetent patient suffering from an incurable, but not terminal,
condition may exercise the patient's right of self-determination by refus-
ing life-sustaining treatment. 34  The court reasoned that by
"[r]ecognizing that one has the inherent right to make choices about
medical treatment, we necessarily conclude that this right encompasses
all medical choices. A competent individual has the constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment regardless of his or her medical condi-
tion."' 35 In holding that this right includes all relevant decisions about
one's health, the court noted that no reason exists to qualify the right
based on type of medical procedure-that is, whether the procedure is
life-prolonging, life-maintaining, or life-sustaining.136 In fact, the court
quoted a passage from Bouvia v. Superior Court 37 in which the Court of
Appeals of California reasoned that the individual's perception of the
quality of her life overrides any physician's estimate of the remaining
quantity of her life.'38
The court went on to discuss the four state interests identified in
Satz.'3 9 It began by stating that "[t]he state has a duty to assure that a
person's wishes regarding medical treatment are respected."' 40 The
court's discussion of the state's interest in preserving life (which it
called the strongest interest) somewhat contradicts its earlier discussion
of the breadth of the right to refuse treatment as well as its decision in
Wons. The court implied that the state has a greater interest if the
patient's disease is curable than if it is not. The court may be retreating
from its earlier position. But, given the very strong terms it used in
granting a broad right to refuse treatment and its use of Bouvia, this is
not likely. In any event, this possible limitation is irrelevant to the pres-
ent discussion because schizophrenia is not generally considered to be
curable. 14 1
The court added nothing to its doctrine on the interests of innocent
third parties or suicide. It essentially eliminated the maintenance of the
133. 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
134. Id. at 7-8. Mrs. Browning had a living will refusing artificial, life-prolonging treatment
including artificial feeding if she developed a terminal condition. Id. at 8. After suffering a
stroke, she was artificially fed by a nasogastric tube (a feeding tube inserted through the nose
directly into the stomach) that the nursing home in which Mrs. Browning was living refused to
discontinue. Id. Mrs. Browning's guardian filed a court petition to have the tube removed. Id.
135. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 11 n.6.
137. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
138. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10-11 (quoting Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05).
139. Id. at 13-14; see supra text accompanying notes 110-21.
140. Browning, 568 So. 2d at 13.
141. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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ethical integrity of the medical profession as a legitimate state inter-
est.' 42 This is significant because that interest is frequently cited in dis-
cussions of treatment refusal in a psychiatric context 43 and is mentioned
specifically in the Health Care Advance Directives Act. 1"
Finally, the Browning court discussed the procedures for decision
making. The court reaffirmed its earlier position that a judicial proceed-
ing is not necessary.' 45 Further, the court recognized that not all patients
will appoint surrogates to carry out their written instructions and held
that, in those cases, a close family member or friend may do so.' 46
Although at first glance this appears to be a minor point, it is not
because Florida's current advance directive statute does not specifically
provide for written instructions without an appointed surrogate except in
a decision concerning the artificial prolongation of life.' 47
In re Dubreuil is the most recent Supreme Court of Florida case
regarding the right of a competent individual to refuse unwanted medical
care in a non-terminal situation. 4 8 Although the primary holding of this
case merely reaffirms Wons, the court's language in getting to that point
may be its broadest yet.149
The court not only opined that the state must not interfere with a
person's health care decisions, it went further and asserted that "'[t]he
state has a duty to assure that a person's wishes regarding medical treat-
ment are respected.'""S Discussing the hospital's role when a third
party questions the patient's wishes, the court reasoned that "a health
care provider's function is to provide medical treatment in accordance
with the patient's wishes and best interests, not as a 'substitute parent'
supervening the wishes of a competent adult. Accordingly, a health care
provider must comply with the wishes of a patient to refuse medical
treatment unless ordered to do otherwise by a court of competent juris-
diction." 5 In this regard, the court receded from its holding in Wons by
placing the burden on the state to assert its interests where the state
142. The court called this interest the "least significant" and reasoned that "the ethical integrity
of the medical profession alone could never override [constitutional] rights." Browning, 568 So.
2d at 14 (quoting Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 101 (Fla. 1989)
(Ehrlich, C.J., concurring)).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
144. See infra text accompanying note 168.
145. In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 15.
146. Id. at 15 n.15.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 159-63.
148. 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 822 (quoting In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13-14).
151. Id. at 823.
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chooses to intervene rather than the hospital.152
In summary, a competent adult in Florida has the right to refuse
medical treatment for essentially any reason regardless of whether his
condition is terminal. This right also applies to incompetent patients
who, while competent, expressed their wishes in writing or appointed a
surrogate to speak for them. The state has three, arguably four, interests
that, depending on the facts, may override the patient's wishes: preserv-
ing life (weakened by the courts' decisions almost to the point of nonex-
istence); protecting innocent third parties; preventing suicide; and,
arguably, maintaining the ethical principles of the medical profession
(again, so weakened as to be of questionable significance).' 53
One could make a compelling argument based on this line of cases
alone that a competent individual has the right to have a mental health
advance directive followed during periods of incompetency. It is not
necessary to make this argument, however, because statutory law goes
further in defining this right.
3. FLORIDA STATUTES
Florida statutory law further undergirds a patient's broad rights of
self-determination. One of the basic rights given to all hospital patients
in Florida is the right to refuse any treatment.154
a. Health Care Advance Directives Act'55
The Advance Directives Act simplified the invocation of the right
to refuse treatment. The Advance Directives Act provides for an indi-
vidual, referred to as the principal,' 56 to designate a health care surrogate
to make health care decisions for the principal upon a determination that
the principal is incapacitated. 57 The designation, which must meet cer-
tain formalities required by the statute, may include specific instructions
for the surrogate to follow. 58  The Advance Directives Act does not
provide specifically for the use of written advance instructions without
152. Id. If the provider wishes to circumvent the patient's wishes, it must notify the state's
attorney who then has the discretion to seek court intervention or not. Id.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 227-38 for a discussion of how these state interests
affect the use of mental health advance directives.
154. FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (1993) (also providing that the right may be limited by other laws).
155. Id. § 765.
156. "'Principal' means a competent adult executing an advance directive and on whose behalf
health care decisions are to be made." Id. § 765.101(14).
157. Id. § 765.202. Florida's "durable" power of attorney act provides that the power is
revoked if the donor is adjudged incompetent after the power is granted. Id. § 709.08(2). It is,
therefore, not durable enough to assist mental health patients in determining the course of their
care while incompetent.
158. Id. § 765.203.
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the appointment of a surrogate.1 59 But it does provide for a proxy who
can make health care decisions for the principal if she has not executed
an advance directive or did not designate a surrogate. 6° The Advance
Directives Act defines who the proxy will be in a priority order, begin-
ning with the principal's court-appointed guardian and then moving
through her family and friends.' 6' The proxy is required to base his
decisions on what he reasonably believes the patient would have decided
under the circumstances.' 62  This implies that the Advance Directives
Act requires the proxy to follow the instructions in the advance direc-
tive, thereby indicating that the legislature anticipated advance directives
without designated surrogates. Furthermore, the holding of Browning
requires this result. 16 3
In accord with the PSDA, the Advance Directives Act requires that
health care facilities'" supply each patient with information concerning
her rights pertaining to advance directives in addition to relevant facility
policies and inquire whether the patient has an advance directive. 65
Additionally, the facility is subject to fine and loss of licensure if it
requires an individual to execute or revoke an advance directive as a
condition of treatment. 166
The legislature based the Advance Directives Act on its finding
"that every competent adult patient has the fundamental right of self-
determination regarding choosing or refusing medical treatment."'' 67
The right to decide is made subject to such societal interests as the "pro-
tection of human life and the preservation of ethical standards in the
medical profession."1 6 1
159. This is specifically addressed only in the context of a living will that applies to life-
sustaining treatment. Id. § 765.303(2).
160. Id. § 765.401(l).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 765.401(2).
163. See supra text accompanying note 146.
164. This term includes hospitals licensed in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(7) (1993). The
definition does not limit the term "hospital" to general medical hospitals.
165. Id. § 765.110(1).
166. Id. § 765.110(2); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 59A-3.190 (1993).
167. FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1) (1993).
168. Id. The legislature's choice in using these two specific interests is interesting, given how
the courts have weakened them. The fact that the legislature enacted this statute after Browning
may indicate that it specifically intended the courts to accord greater weight to these interests.
How the courts will interpret this passage remains to be seen, but they must give greater deference
to a constitutionally-protected fundamental right, which the Supreme Court of Florida has
construed the right to refuse treatment to be, than a statement of legislative intent. State ex rel.
West v. Butler, 69 So. 771 (Fla. 1915). Accordingly, the courts' position should not change. The
Advance Directives Act's provisions are "cumulative to the existing law regarding an individual's
right to consent, or refuse to consent, to medical treatment .... " FLA. STAT. § 765.106 (1993).
This provision should inform interpretation of the legislature's finding that the state has an interest
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The legislature's stated intent in passing the Advance Directives
Act was to establish a procedure, less costly and less restrictive than a
guardianship, that would "allow a person to plan for incapacity by
designating another person to direct the course of his medical treatment
upon his incapacity."' 69 The Advance Directives Act defines "incapac-
ity" and "incompetent" as "physically or mentally unable to communi-
cate a willful and knowing health care decision."'170 A health care
decision means, in relevant part, "[i]nformed consent, refusal of con-
sent, or withdrawal of consent to any and all health care . . ."" The
Advance Directives Act does not define "medical care" or "health
care"-a potentially significant omission.
There is no extrinsic indication whether the legislature intended the
Advance Directives Act to apply to psychiatric treatment. Its structure
and some of its language, however, make it reasonable to construe the
Advance Directives Act as including psychiatric treatment. For exam-
ple, it specifically applies to hospitalized (voluntary or involuntary)
mental health patients with the capacity to make health care decisions.'72
Structurally, the Advance Directives Act has separate provisions
for advance directives covering life-prolonging procedures, namely liv-
ing wills, and advance directives generally. Obviously, the legislature
intended the Advance Directives Act to apply to more than end-of-life
decisions. The legislature made this intent clear when it changed the
name of the statute.' 73
The Advance Directives Act applies to "any and all" health care
decisions.' 74  The plain meaning of these words is certainly broad
enough to encompass mental health care.' 7  Furthermore, the Advance
Directives Act prohibits the inference that because a patient is in a psy-
chiatric hospital, voluntarily or involuntarily, the patient is incompe-
tent.' 76 This provision would not have been necessary if the legislature
did not intend that advance directives be used in psychiatric hospitals.
The Advance Directives Act presumes that a principal is capable of
in protecting human life and the ethical standards of the medical profession because it
demonstrates an intent not to disturb previous court decisions such as Browning.
169. FLA. STAT. § 765.102(2) (1993).
170. Id. § 765.101(9).
171. Id. § 765.101(6)(a) (emphasis added).
172. Id. § 765.204(1) (prohibiting an inference of incapacity solely from a patient's voluntary
or involuntary hospitalization).
173. The Advance Directives Act was formerly known as The Right to Decline Life
Prolonging Procedures. The name changed in the 1993 Florida Statutes. Id. § 765.
174. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
175. Florida's canons of statutory construction require consideration first of the plain meaning
of the language. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982).
176. FLA. STAT. § 765.204(1) (1993).
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making health care decisions unless she is found to be incapacitated. It
then describes the procedure for rebutting this presumption.' 77 This pro-
cedure requires the concurrence of two physicians, including the princi-
pal's attending physician.' 78 Once the physicians determine that the
patient is incapacitated, the surrogate must be notified in writing.17 9 The
surrogate then has the authority to act for the principal pursuant to the
principal's instructions until a determination is made that the principal
has regained capacity. 80 This provision appears to contemplate the use
of advance directives in a psychiatric context in which individuals move
in and out of competency. Presumably, although it is not mentioned, a
court's finding of incompetency under the relevant sections of the Flor-
ida Mental Health Act' 8' or the Guardianship statute 82 would also trig-
ger the advance directive. The Advance Directives Act provides that if a
court appoints a guardian of the principal's property or person after a
surrogate has been designated, the surrogate continues to be responsible
for making health care decisions. 8 3
The Advance Directives Act allows the principal to revoke an
advance directive or appointment of a surrogate at any time.184 The rev-
ocation may be written, oral, or by physical destruction of the written
document.' 85 The Advance Directives Act, however, does not require
that the principal be competent when she revokes her advance directive.
This omission poses a potential problem for the use of advance
directives by psychiatric patients because, once again, the possibility
exists that physicians and hospital staff will coerce the patient.' 86 This
is especially true when an involuntary patient is dependent upon her
physician's recommendation that she be discharged.' 87 One way to
resolve this problem of coercion is to require that a patient be competent
(as measured by the same standard required for execution of an advance
directive) for a revocation to be valid. The legislature could make this
change, but legal precedent also supports this argument without such
legislation.
177. Id. § 765.204(2).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. § 765.204(2) & (3).
181. Id. § 394.467(3)(c).
182. Id. § 744.331.
183. Id. § 765.205(3).
184. Id. § 765.104(1).
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying note 3. Patient advocates in Florida who are educating
mental health patients about advance directives have found that many patients are reluctant to
execute the directives out of fear that physicians will not treat them. Telephone Interview with
Joanie Halberg, Mental Health Assoc. of Dade County, Fla. (Mar. 14, 1993).
187. See MUR'HY, supra note 1, at 187-88.
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In Florida, an individual must be competent to revoke a will."' 8
The formalities required for an advance directive are similar to a will.'
89
Furthermore, both are designed to give effect to the maker's intent when
the maker cannot. Requiring capacity to revoke an advance directive
furthers the same policy as the requirement of capacity to revoke a will.
So doing would reinforce the patient's right to refuse treatment. 190
Finally, the Advance Directives Act includes a provision that
allows a "patient's family, the health care facility, . . . the attending
physician, or any other interested person" to seek judicial intervention in
the surrogate's decision. 9' The party requesting judicial intervention
must believe that the surrogate's decision is not in accord with the
patient's wishes or the Advance Directives Act; that the advance direc-
tive is ambiguous or that the patient changed her mind; or that the surro-
gate was improperly designated or the designation is no longer
effective. 92 These limited justifications for intervention clearly indicate
that disagreement with the patient's decision, or a third party's concern
about the consequences to the patient, are not sufficient for judicial
intervention.
b. The Florida Mental Health Act'9 3
Florida's Mental Health Act establishes the rights of all civil
patients 94 in psychiatric hospitals as well as the criteria and procedures
for involuntary hospitalization, examination, and treatment. In enacting
188. Tonnelier v. Tonnelier, 181 So. 150, 151 (1938) (revocation requires the same capacity as
execution).
189. A testator must sign the will in the presence of two attesting witnesses. FLA. STAT.
§ 732.502(1) (1993). Similarly, the principal must sign the advance directive in the presence of
two attesting witnesses. Id. § 765.202(1).
190. Requiring competency to revoke would not prevent the physician from coercing a patient
to consent to treatment. In fact, the physician may have incentive to find that a patient is
competent to revoke an advance directive so that she could then coerce the patient into consenting
to unwanted treatment. Ultimately, the solution to this problem may become more obvious after
continued experience with the use of advance directives in this context and third-party monitoring.
191. FLA. STAT. § 765.105 (1993).
192. Id.
193. Id. §§ 394.451 - 394.4789.
194. The topic discussed in this Comment is relevant to forensic psychiatric patients, but its
application in that context is beyond the scope of this Comment. These patients are individuals
involved with the mental health system as a result of some action of the criminal court, such as
evaluation or treatment for competency to stand trial or a trial court finding of insanity. It is
interesting that when a forensic patient refuses treatment and no emergency exists, treatment can
be administered by court order only. The court must use substituted judgment in these
circumstances and must consider the patient's expressed preferences, the probability of adverse
side effects, the prognosis without treatment, and the prognosis with treatment. Id. § 916.107(3).
Arguably, this statute provides greater protection to the forensic patient than the civil patient. No
such requirements exist for the guardian advocate appointed to make treatment decisions for the
civil patient. See infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
19931
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the Mental Health Act, the legislature purported to ensure that "individ-
ual dignity and human rights be guaranteed to all persons admitted to
mental health facilities or being detained [for involuntary examina-
tion].' 95 Another important aspect of legislative intent is that "the least
restrictive means of intervention be employed based on the individual
needs of each patient ....
The Mental Health Act provides that "[n]o person who is receiving
treatment for mental illness in a facility shall be deprived of any consti-
tutional rights."'197 This clause is limited to the extent that general law
limits the rights of any individual adjudicated incompetent. 98 The
Browning decision held that the Florida Constitution gives incompetent
patients the right to refuse treatment through either a surrogate or written
instructions. 99 Thus, the right to privacy and its subordinate right to
refuse medical treatment survive psychiatric hospitalization and incom-
petence. The state's parens patriae and police powers may trump these
rights .200
The Mental Health Act also requires that each patient entering a
facility be asked to give express and informed consent to treatment and
admission.2" 1 It further requires that when a voluntary patient refuses to
consent or revokes consent he must be discharged within three days
unless he meets the criteria for involuntary admission, in which case
commitment proceedings must be initiated within those three days.20 2
The PSDA limits the applicability of this provision when a patient has
an advance directive. The PSDA prohibits discrimination by hospitals
against patients with advance directives.20 3 Certainly situations could
arise in which a patient so restricts the hospital that there would be noth-
ing that the hospital could do for the patient. Other, less limiting cases
could arise as well. For example, a patient's advance directive or surro-
gate could refuse a specific medication, but this would not prevent the
195. FLA. STAT. § 394.453(1)(a) (1993).
196. Id.
197. Id. § 394.459(1). The term "facility" includes all hospitals designated for the evaluation,
diagnosis, care, treatment, training, or hospitalization of the mentally ill. This includes private
facilities. Id. § 394.455(6).
1.98. Id. § 394.459(1) (stating that "if such a person is adjudicated incompetent ... his rights
may be limited to the same extent the rights of any incompetent person are limited by general
law.").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 133-53.
200. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
201. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (1993) (applying only to competent patients).
202. Id. § 394,459(3)(a). The language of the statute seemingly allows a hospital to discharge
a patient with an advance directive when he becomes incompetent during his stay if he does not
meet the standard for involuntary treatment and his advance directive refuses some or all
treatment.
203. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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use of other medications or other treatment modalities. The PSDA's
nondiscrimination provision should prevent the hospital from refusing to
admit or to continue to treat the patient simply because the patient limits
the hospital's treatment choices where other viable treatments remain.
When a patient refuses treatment and is held pending involuntary
commitment proceedings, the Mental Health Act allows the hospital to
render the least restrictive 204 emergency treatment available, without
judicial intervention, to any patient who refuses treatment if the hospital
determines that treatment is necessary for the safety of the patient or
others.2"5 If the refused treatment is "essential to appropriate care for
the patient" then the hospital administrator must petition for a hearing to
determine whether the patient is competent to consent for himself.2°
The key issue here involves determining the type of emergency that
will allow the hospital to override the patient's advance directive. A
hospital could legitimately exercise police power to protect third parties
from danger.20 7 As previously stated, however, the hospital must use
any available, acceptable alternative to the refused treatment.208
The analysis changes when the patient's well-being is at stake in
the emergency. The patient must be considered the judge of what is best
for her. The hospital should follow her instructions or those of her sur-
rogate because the advance directive tends to further the patient's values
and wishes. To do otherwise would be to undermine the notion of self-
determination that advance directives protect. In an analogous situation
involving an individual's physical health, this issue probably would not
even arise because few people would question the validity of the
advance directive for the physically infirm.
The Mental Health Act also grants the patient the right to two rep-
resentatives if the patient lacks a guardian.2 9  The representatives
receive notice when the patient is involuntarily admitted to the hospital
or the hospital files a petition to change the patient's voluntary status to
204. See supra text accompanying note 55 for a discussion of the least restrictive treatment
requirement and the use of advance directives.
205. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (1993).
206. Id. The statute does not define "appropriate care." Because the administrator must take
action in the circumstances described, it is reasonable to infer that the statute refers to care for the
patient in an "administrative" context rather than a safety context. That is, the facility's best
interests may be the consideration rather than the patient's best interests. This understanding
would explain the additional procedural safeguards the statute requires.
207. See Parry, supra note 13, at 474; supra text accompanying notes 52-54. This assumes
that a hospital's use of the state's police power will be legitimate. This assumption surely
overstates reality.
208. See supra text accompanying note 55.
209. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(12)(a) (1993). The patient may designate one representative, and
the facility designates the other (or both if the patient fails to designate the first) according to
statutory listing of next of kin in the order the state prefers. Id. § 394.459(12)(b).
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involuntary.210 The ability to designate a representative is important
because, presumably, the patient may designate her health care surrogate
as her representative to ensure that the surrogate is informed of her
admission and ongoing status.
The requirements for involuntary examination and involuntary hos-
pitalization implicate the extent to which the patient can determine the
treatment she receives. The relevant portions of these standards are
essentially the same: (1) the patient has refused voluntary examination
or treatment or is unable to determine for herself whether examination or
treatment is necessary; and (2) without care or treatment she is likely to
neglect herself and this neglect poses a real threat of substantial harm to
her well being; or there is a substantial likelihood that without care or
treatment she will cause serious bodily harm to herself or others.2 1
Although the determination of the patient's competency to consent
to treatment is a separate decision from that to commit her, a court
makes them concurrently.21 2 According to this section, "a patient is
incompetent to consent to treatment if his judgment is so affected by his
mental illness that he lacks the capacity to make a well-reasoned, will-
ful, and knowing decision concerning treatment. '213 If the court finds
that the patient is incompetent to consent to treatment, it must appoint a
guardian advocate214 to act on the patient's behalf in providing informed
consent.21 5
The competency standard used by the Mental Health Act slightly
differs from the one used in the Advance Directives Act. The Mental
Health Act bases its standard on the patient's ability to make a deci-
sion;216 the Advance Directives Act bases its standard on communicat-
ing the decision.21 7 In practice, the difference is irrelevant because the
210. Id. § 394.459(12)(a).
211. Id. §§ 394.463(1), 394.467(1).
212. Id. § 394.467(3)(c). This is consistent with the Health Care Advance Directives Act's
provision that voluntary or involuntary psychiatric hospitalization does not imply that the patient
lacks capacity. See supra text accompanying note 176.
213. FLA. STAT. § 394.459(3)(a) (1993).
214. A guardian advocate's sole responsibility is the "custody and control of the patient's
competence to consent to treatment." Id. § 394.455(15).
215. Dade County, Florida's largest county, has four guardian advocates for county residents
who are hospitalized and adjudicated incompetent. A court appoints guardian advocates only
when patients refuse treatment. Notably, guardian advocates consent to treatment at least ninety-
nine percent of the time. Telephone Interview with Judge Lewis Kimler, General Master, Dade
County, Fla. Probate Court (Mar. 17, 1993). The court instructs guardian advocates to consider
the patient's wishes but then to decide using a best interest standard. Judge Kimler has not been
faced with an advance directive, but if he were, he would consider it without feeling bound by it
because the statute does not specifically address mental health advance directives. Id.
216. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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ability to make a decision is meaningless without the ability to commu-
nicate it.218 This discrepancy, therefore, should not create a problem in
implementing advance directives in the mental health context.
Another difference that may create a legal issue regarding whether
to extend advance directives to the mental health field is in the proce-
dures required to determine capacity. The Mental Health Act requires a
judicial decision, but the Advance Directives Act requires a medical
decision.219 The Advance Directives Act's procedure appears to be
based on the Browning decision holding that judicial determination is
unnecessary. 220 This does not mean that a judicial determination would
be ineffective. The competency hearing under the Mental Health Act
will develop the same evidence that physicians use under the Advance
Directives Act. The patient, therefore, would receive the same, if not
greater, due process. Accordingly, the differing procedures for deter-
mining capacity should not counsel against mental health patients using
advance directives.
c. Electroconvulsive and Psychosurgical Procedures 22'
The statute governing electroconvulsive and psychosurgical proce-
dures requires the patient's or guardian's written informed consent
before procedures may be administered.222 It does not make an excep-
tion for emergency treatment, and thus the right to refuse these treat-
ments is absolute. The patient's absolute right to refuse does not,
however, imply that an incompetent patient's guardian advocate may not
consent if she believes this treatment is in the patient's best interest. An
advance directive should be given effect in this situation because the
legislature has placed the decision solely within the patient's discretion.
V. MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN FLORIDA
The Florida Constitution, cases, and statutes, along with the Patient
Self-Determination Act, combine to provide a solid basis that supports
the use of mental health advance directives. The Florida Constitution
and case law grant broad rights of self-determination to patients. Even
218. For an interesting discussion of the role of communication in competency proceedings,
see Susan Stefan, Silencing the Different Voice: Competence, Feminist Theory and Law, 47 U.
MiAMi L. REV. 763 (1993). The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Stefan for her
invaluable guidance and support.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 177-90, 212.
220. See supra text accompanying note 146.
221. FLA. STAT. § 458.325 (1993).
222. Id. § 458.325(1). The patient or guardian must be informed of the procedure's purpose,
its common side effects, alternate treatments, the approximate number of procedures considered
necessary, and the patient or guardian may revoke consent prior to or between treatments.
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without the Advance Directives Act, the Supreme Court of Florida has
found that an equivalent right to self-determination exists under the Flor-
ida Constitution. 223 The court has interpreted the right to refuse treat-
ment in broad terms 224 and held that almost any reason or no reason
would be sufficient to exercise this right.225 Furthermore, the court has
extended this right to all medical decisions, regardless of the type of
procedure or its purpose.2 26
As previously noted, the Supreme Court of Florida made these
rights subject to four state interests. The first is the preservation of life.
Courts have subordinated this interest, however, to the individual's right
of self-determination.227 This same reasoning should apply to mental
health patients and their treatment. Allowing this, however, would con-
flict with the Mental Health Act. As already noted, it allows a patient to
be involuntarily hospitalized if the patient's safety or well-being is
threatened. 228  This use of the state's parens patriae power directly
opposes the patient's right of self-determination.
The psychiatric patient's situation is clearly analogous to a situation
where a Jehovah's Witness refuses a blood transfusion. In both cases
the patient may have no underlying terminal condition, yet her treatment
refusal may lead to her death or disability. Application of the state's
parens patriae power could conceivably prevent harm in either case.
The Supreme Court of Florida held in Wons, a blood transfusion refusal
case, that a patient's privacy right is superior to the state's interest in
preserving life.229  The result should be no different for psychiatric
patients. Arguably, to the extent that the Mental Health Act utilizes the
state's parens patriae power, it is unconstitutional in light of Wons and
Browning.23 °
223. See supra text accompanying notes 110-47.
224. See supra text accompanying note 153.
225. See supra text accompanying note 130.
226. See supra text accompanying note 136.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 128-38.
228. See supra text accompanying note 211.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 128-32. If the court had used freedom of religion as
the basis of its decision, one could distinguish Wons on that basis. The court, however, did not
choose to do so. Additionally, if the state has no interest, without more, in life itself, it surely has
no interest in the individual's quality of life. Arguably, it is economically inefficient to allow
psychiatric patients to remain untreated because such patients may be unproductive; they also may
be unproductive with treatment. Certainly, treatment itself is costly.
230. As far as I know, no one has developed this radical argument. A commitment based on
danger to others, however, is not different from many other health care situations where treatment
could help a patient who refuses to seek care. For example, the state would presumably not
forcibly treat an individual with cancer or heart disease. Query whether there is a principled way
to constitutionally distinguish between such situations. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of
this Comment to do so.
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The state's second interest is in the protection of innocent third
parties. Courts generally consider this interest in relation to a patient's
minor children.2 31 In the mental health context, however, one could
raise this issue in relation to protection of members of society generally
and of other patients and hospital staff specifically.232
As this interest relates to the patient's minor children, the Supreme
Court of Florida held in Wons that where there is an alternative source of
care for the child, such as a spouse or other family members, the state's
interest does not override the patient's rights.233 This same reasoning
applies to mental health patients. The Mental Health Act's use of the
state's police power to protect society from dangerous individuals or to
protect other patients and staff within the hospital falls within this same
state interest although it may trump a patient's right of self-determina-
tion to some extent.234
The third state interest is prevention of suicide. The courts differ-
entiate the right-to-die cases from suicide by pointing to the fact that in
right-to-die cases, it is the patient's underlying disease that would be the
cause of death and not an extraneous agent. Unlike suicide, the patient
in right-to-die cases has no independent wish to die.235 The state could
argue that when a psychiatric patient refuses treatment and is unable or
unwilling to care for herself to the extent that her life is threatened, then
she is, in effect, committing suicide. One could counter this argument
by pointing out that the underlying disease is actually placing the psy-
chiatric patient's life at risk and that this disease is not self-inflicted.
Furthermore, the patient probably would prefer to live a happy life, but
the quality of her life may be unacceptable as a result of her underlying
disease. As already noted, the individual's perception of her quality of
life overrides outside concerns about her quantity of life.236
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the final state interest is
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession and that
the institutional concerns this interest raises are subordinate to the
patient's right to privacy.237 The Advance Directives Act also pays
homage to this interest. In light of the constitutional basis of a patient's
right to privacy, however, the privacy right trumps any statement of leg-
islative intent.238
231. See supra text accompanying note 116.
232. In other words, use the state's police power. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
233. See supra text accompanying note 131.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
236. See supra text accompanying note 138.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
238. See supra note 168.
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Combining the strength of this constitutionally-based case law with
the rights granted by the Advance Directives Act in language clearly
broad enough to include mental health, the right of mental health
patients in Florida to use advance directives is clear. No state interest,
other than protection of third parties that deals with control rather than
treatment, is paramount over the individual's right to self-determination.
Practical concerns exist that could inhibit mental health patients
from fully realizing their rights.2 39 The first hurdle is to establish com-
petency at the time the patient executes the advance directive. This
should not be a concern because the law presumes individuals to be
competent until adjudicated or determined incompetent.240 This means,
therefore, that the law should presume an advance directive valid unless
contrary evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption. Concerns
about this issue arise in the mental health context only because of the
stereotypes associated with mental illness.241
Another potential problem is the method used to inform a facility of
the existence of an advance directive when a patient is involuntarily
admitted and not able to communicate this fact. 42 The state could
develop a centralized computer filing system that could keep advance
directives submitted by potential patients. State hospitals could access
this database whenever a patient is admitted and the patient is not able to
provide the information. Also, patients who routinely go to the same
hospitals or mental health clinics could give those facilities copies of
their advance directives for the institutions' records. The patient also
could give a copy to her surrogate or to a patient advocacy group that
might become aware of her hospitalization. Finally, the patient could
carry a wallet-size copy.
To deal with the potential for coercion if hospital personnel fulfill
the requirements of the PSDA, outside ombudsmen, patient advocates,
or legal aid groups could be used to inform patients of their rights and to
239. This Comment addresses some of the more difficult implementation problems, although it
is beyond its scope to develop a detailed implementation plan.
240. FLA. STAT. § 765.204(1) (1993).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 52. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (West Supp. 1993) may protect psychiatric patients from the
effects of this type of stereotyping. In passing the ADA, Congress found that discrimination
persists in institutional and health services and that individuals with disabilities encounter
discrimination in the form of overprotective rules and policies, among others. Id. § 12101(a).
"Disability" includes "mental impairments." Id. § 12102(2)(A). Arguably, the ADA's coverage
is broad enough to protect psychiatric patients from discrimination in implementing patients'
advance directives.
242. These concerns are addressed to medically indigent patients who must rely on the state's
mental health system. Private patients, while still subject to coercion, will usually not face these
practical concerns because they can give a copy of their advance directives to their physicians and
to the hospitals in which their physicians practice.
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assist patients who wish to execute an advance directive. These same
groups could be called in to verify a patient's intent to revoke an
advance directive. This would ensure that the patient's execution or rev-
ocation of an advance directive is voluntary and that the patient has the
requisite capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although one can distinguish the defining a patient's right to pri-
vacy from mental health cases by the fact that the privacy right cases do
not arise in a psychiatric context, there is a principled way to make this
argument. No statute can take away a patient's constitutional rights. In
fact, the Mental Health Act specifically grants the right to refuse treat-
ment.24 3 Certainly the state has the power to control individuals in order
to protect third parties, but this power emanates from a very different
moral basis than the state's parens patriae power. Paternalism long ago
lost its dominant role as the basis for determining a patient's right to
control her own health care. No basis exists for it to remain dominant in
the mental health context.
One obvious alternative that would avoid any question of the appli-
cability of advance directives to mental health patients is the enactment
of a statute that specifically provides this right, such as Minnesota's.2 44
This solution has the drawback of "ghettoizing" mental health patients
as a separate class. 4
The Massachusetts approach, which defines health care decisions to
include mental health treatment decisions, is preferable. 46 This, how-
ever, may not be politically feasible. The best assurance of the right to
execute mental health advance directives, therefore, may be a Supreme
Court of Florida decision holding that an individual's right to privacy as
determined in such cases as Wons and Browning constitutionally man-
dates acceptance of mental health advance directives.
Certainly there are drawbacks associated with the use of mental
health advance directives. Probably the most significant concern is an
individual's ability to anticipate future circumstances and to account for
243. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
244. See supra note 8 1.
245. Minnesota used a separate statute because it was not politically feasible to include this
right in the state's living will statute. Supporters of the right of mental health patients to use
advance directives preferred a unified statute. Even with the separate statute, however, judges
look for ways to avoid the advance directive and order treatment against the patient's wishes.
Telephone Interview with Kathy Kosnoff, Staff Attorney, Minnesota Mental Health Law Project
(Jan. 14, 1993).
246. See supra note 81.
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all contingencies.247 One can use that same argument against all
advance directives, however, and it has no special force when applied to
mental health advance directives. If that argument is valid, the appropri-
ateness of the general concept of advance directives is suspect. One
may never account for every contingency when making any decision-
the same is true with advance directives. But as long as society believes
that self-determination is a value worth protecting, no principled method
exists to distinguish between general medical treatment and psychiatric
treatment.
Applying advance directives in a psychiatric treatment context pre-
serves the right of self-determination for the incompetent psychiatric
patient. These individuals cannot always rely on family or friends to
ensure that their wishes are fulfilled. Psychiatric patients are frequently
in an adversarial position with the hospital that is "treating" them. Even
if family or friends attempt to carry the patient's banner, courts often
thwart this effort, frequently at the hospital's behest. Advance direc-
tives, therefore, may be the only way to preserve the patient's right to
self-determination. The Florida Constitution and statutes and courts'
interpretation of them clearly support the use of advance directives by
Florida mental health patients to control their psychiatric treatment.
LESTER J. PERLING
247. Appelbaum, supra note 79, at 983.
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